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F eminists often decry John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice for its neglect of gender issues.  While Susan Moller Okin argues that Rawls’ “principles of justice can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of our soci-
ety,” the imperative word is “can.”1  Central to Rawls’ theory of 
justice is the equalizing veil of ignorance, which can support 
quite radical notions of gender equality and can be used, as I will 
show, to justify the legality of abortion.  In a later essay, Rawls 
acknowledges that his veil of ignorance makes people ignorant 
of their sex;2 however, in the original work, if people behind the 
veil are unaware of their genders, it is in no way made explicit.  
When Rawls first details what knowledge people behind the veil 
are ignorant of, he states, “[N]o one knows his place in society, 
his class position or social status, nor does any one know his for-
tune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence, strength, and the like.”3  If Rawls had intended gender to 
be among “the like” characteristics, his repeated and consistent 
usage of the male pronoun indicates otherwise.  Despite Rawls’ 
Douglas Dreier is a native of Toledo, Ohio and will graduate from Cor-
nell University in May 2010 with a B.A. in philosophy and minors in 
Inequality Studies and Law & Society.  His philosophical interests lie 
primarily in ethics and political philosophy, with an emphasis on 
thorny, hot-button political issues.  He is currently focusing on the na-
ture of the free rider problem for childbearing and on what society has 
the right to demand of its citizens in the event of widespread under-
population.  After graduation, he plans on continuing his studies in law 
school.  
general neglect of issues central to gender relations, the princi-
ples and concepts Rawls utilizes to formulate his theory of justice 
can provide a much-needed reformulation of Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s pro-choice ruling in Roe v. Wade. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion on Roe v. Wade, as delivered 
by Justice Blackmun, can be quickly torn asunder.  The ruling 
arbitrarily divided the period of pregnancy into three trimesters 
and prohibited the states from illegalizing abortion in only the 
first two.  Central to the decision was the “right of privacy … 
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action,” which the Court tenu-
ously claimed to be “broad enough” to include a woman’s right 
to terminate her pregnancy.4  Justice Blackmun also emphasized, 
perhaps to the point of exaggeration, the economic, psychologi-
cal, and physical suffering bearing a fetus to term could impose 
upon a parent.5  In effect, the Court held the liberty of a pregnant 
mother in greater esteem than the potential life of a fetus. 
Justice Blackmun conceded, “If this suggestion of person-
hood [for the fetus] is established, the appellant’s case, of course, 
collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed 
specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”6  Citing the leni-
ency with which states had historically treated abortion, the 
Court decided that the appellee had failed to prove the fetus’ 
personhood; however, this does not mean that the Court consid-
ered the question of personhood to be resolved.  Indeed, the 
Court declared, “We need not resolve the difficult question of 
when life begins.”7  These findings are not antithetical.  It may be 
the case that life does begin at conception, yet the legal need to 
defend that life only begins at a later time.  Justice Blackmun 
stressed the United States’ consistent record of differentiating 
between abortion and murder, which would be an arbitrary dis-
tinction if the Constitution viewed the fetus as an equal person.  
Until 1860, abortion “before quickening” was not a crime in Con-
necticut, and in 1828, New York ruled that aborting an 
“unquickened fetus” was a misdemeanor, while aborting a 
“quick fetus” was still only second-degree manslaughter.8  Even 
the specific Texas state law pertaining to the case failed to hold 
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consistently that the fetus was a person.9  If a fetus were just as 
much a person as an adult, then in cases in which the mother’s 
life is not at stake (because otherwise self-defense could be ar-
gued), abortion and murder would deserve equal punishments, 
yet the widespread opinion among the American public then and 
now did not consider the two crimes equivalent. 
History has proven that the decision reached in Roe v. 
Wade was not convincing enough to dispel the controversy sur-
rounding either the morality or the legality of abortion.  In his 
dissent, Justice Rehnquist singled out three dubious points in 
particular: the debatable argument that the Court need not de-
fend the life of a fetus because the laws of the past had often con-
strued abortion as a lesser crime than murder,10 the arbitrariness 
in allowing states to illegalize abortions in the last trimester but 
not the first two,11 and the questionable assumption that the right 
to privacy applies to abortions.12  Indeed, pro-life advocates can 
find much worthy of denouncement in the ruling, including the 
matters brought up in Rehnquist’s dissent and also in Justice 
Blackmun’s hyperbolic description of how much suffering a 
pregnant woman undergoes.13  The philosophically deficient ar-
gument presented in Roe v. Wade must either be bolstered or en-
tirely dismissed, and it is here that Rawls’ theory of justice can 
provide much-needed support. 
A quick summary of Rawls’ theory of justice is in order.  
The cornerstones of his theory are the two principles of justice: 
first, “[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most exten-
sive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system of liberty for all,” and second, “[s]ocial and economic ine-
qualities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the great-
est benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just sav-
ings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”14  The first 
principle has priority over the second principle, meaning that 
“infringements of the basic equal liberties protected by the first 
principle cannot be justified … by greater social and economic 
advantages.”15  Were the right to procure an abortion a “basic 
liberty,” then the priority of the first principle over the second 
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would immediately answer the question of its legality; however, 
Rawls does not provide such a straightforward answer to the co-
nundrum, nor should he.  He limits the basic liberties to a concise 
list, which includes “political liberty … and freedom of speech 
and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; free-
dom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological 
oppression and physical assault … [and] the right to hold per-
sonal property and [the] freedom from arbitrary arrest and sei-
zure.”16  While he leaves open the possibility of additional basic 
liberties, the right to procure an abortion does not seem concur-
rent with the scope of those rights on the list.  In Rawls’ later 
book, Political Liberalism, he makes explicit that the list should not 
be significantly expanded because “[w]henever we enlarge the 
list of basic liberties we risk weakening the protection of the most 
essential ones.”17  Moreover, Rawls’ overwhelming silence on 
feminist issues provides even greater reason to think that abor-
tion would not be on the list. 
Since the answer cannot be found in the basic liberties, 
we must return to the veil of ignorance.  As previously men-
tioned, A Theory of Justice is somewhat reactionary in its treat-
ment of gender, but Rawls’ later statement that a person’s sex is 
unknown behind the veil allows for the possibility that a person 
behind the veil could be a woman and could even be pregnant.  
In addition, people in this position “do not know their concep-
tions of the good or their special psychological propensities.”18  
Rawls later clarifies this by stating that a person’s “particular re-
ligious, philosophical, or moral … doctrine with its associated 
conception of the good is not a reason … to propose, or to expect 
others to accept, a conception of justice that favors those of that 
persuasion.”19  Because this claim will prove essential in the ar-
gument for abortion, it is important that it be justified.  Behind 
the veil, all persons seek to pursue that which is to their personal 
benefit; however, due to their ignorance of who they are and due 
to their unwillingness to gamble away their lives based on mere 
probabilities, they seek a society in which the worst off person is 
as well off as possible.  Their decision behind the veil is thus 
unanimous.  Were people permitted to be aware of their particu-
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lar conceptions of the good, this decision would not be unani-
mous, as people would seek to ensure the successful implemen-
tation of their individual conceptions.  As Ronald Dworkin states 
in his essay on the subject, just as “[m]en who do not know to 
which class they belong cannot design institutions, consciously 
or unconsciously, to favor their own class[, m]en who have no 
idea of their own conception of the good cannot act to favor 
those who hold one ideal over those who hold another.”20  As 
difficult as it is to ignore one’s particular conception of the good, 
it is necessary in order to ensure impartiality—in order to ensure 
that people are not seeking their own interests at the expense of 
others.  This is a rational precondition to the veil of ignorance.  
Anyone who admires the concept of the veil for allowing people 
to pursue their self-interest unselfishly cannot grant an exemp-
tion to special conceptions of the good. 
Any tenet held by people of conviction that is not purely 
factual would qualify as a conception of the good to be forgotten 
behind the veil.  Admittedly, such a sentence is problematic.  
Many people claim not merely to possess a particular belief on 
when personhood begins, but rather to know when it does.  It re-
quires careful, unbiased scrutiny of the objective facts to deter-
mine what is belief and what is knowledge.  In his analysis on 
Rawls, Thomas Nagel discusses the difficulty in determining 
when “an appeal to truth collapses into an appeal to belief:” Na-
gel explains that “some people might try to deny objective … sci-
entific methods that most of us would consider as clear cases of 
impersonal verification, whereas others might claim objective 
status for certain theological arguments or forms of revelation.”21  
Even still, the empirical difficulty in distinguishing between 
what is a matter of belief and what is a matter of knowledge is 
not reason enough to dismiss Rawls’ notion.  Certainly some 
people can distinguish a belief from a fact, and that is all that is 
needed.22 
Some would argue that it is a matter of fact when life be-
gins, and perhaps that is true; however, what is not a matter of 
fact is when personhood begins, and personhood is what is es-
sential.  The central tenet of the pro-life defense is not simply that 
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fetuses are alive—after all, mice are alive and few would argue 
that killing mice is prima facie immoral—but that the fetuses are 
living persons.  Whether something is alive is verifiable, but 
whether something is a person is not, so the question must arise 
as to what makes something a person.  Should we determine per-
sonhood by genetics?  If that is the case, do people with Klinefel-
ter’s syndrome, who therefore have an extra chromosome, meet 
the criterion for personhood?  Perhaps to be more inclusive, we 
should define personhood by parentage, but if that is the defini-
tion and since the theory of evolution has shown that humans 
and chimpanzees have a common ancestor, should we not in-
clude chimpanzees as persons?  Perhaps these biological defini-
tions do not hold the answer.  The most widely accepted view 
today is that a person is a “rational” entity who exhibits 
“consciousness,” yet this definition is also rife with problems.23  
Do people in temporary comas qualify as rational persons?  
What about people in permanent vegetative states, or what about 
our ancestors billions of years ago?  Again, the facts of evolution 
serve to muddle the definition.  The entity that was the common 
ancestor of humans and rabbits, for instance, was not a rational 
being.  Was Lucy, the Australopithecus afarensis, rational?  What 
about Java Man, the Homo erectus?  It is unlikely that rationality 
suddenly struck in the course of human evolution; rather, there 
was a spectrum of varying levels of rationality.  Wherever the 
line is drawn would be arbitrary.  Indeed, to choose any of the 
definitions would be arbitrary, and at its foundation, based on an 
unproven and unprovable belief pertaining to the nature of per-
sonhood.  With the objectivity of personhood undermined, pro-
life advocates could argue instead that abortion is wrong because 
a fetus is a potential person, and as Eike-Henner Kluge has ar-
gued, “a potential person has the same moral status as an actual 
person;”24 however, this argument is even more apparently a 
matter of belief than was the former argument.  This defense re-
lies on an abstract claim about what is right—a claim with which 
reasonable people could rationally disagree. 
Pro-life advocates could then proceed to claim that none 
of morality is factual, and that the same reasoning used to sup-
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port skepticism of a fetus’s right to life applies to all moral 
claims.  Should we be likewise skeptical of the right to life for all 
persons?  This question returns us to Rawls’ first principle of jus-
tice.  A just society prohibits the wanton murdering of persons 
because the freedom from physical assault is among the basic 
liberties.  The findings in the previous two paragraphs may ques-
tion why the basic liberties should be ensured.  Here it is impor-
tant to emphasize that Rawls is establishing a theory of justice, 
not a theory of morality per se.  The protection of basic liberties is 
an outgrowth of Rawls’ “general conception of justice,” which 
states that “[a]ll social values—liberty and opportunity, income 
and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect—are to be distrib-
uted equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of 
these values is to everyone’s advantage.”25  Rawls seeks to estab-
lish a theory of justice under which all persons could live and 
thrive with dignity.  For this reason, the freedom from physical 
assault and the other basic liberties are ensured.  Refraining from 
granting fetuses this freedom does not threaten the ability of per-
sons within the society to achieve that dignity (remembering that 
whether fetuses are persons is a matter of belief to be set aside). 
Here we return to the veil of ignorance.  People behind 
the veil must put aside their conceptions of the good, including 
their belief pertaining to abortion’s morality or immorality.  In 
their ignorance, they must acknowledge three facts: one, they 
could possibly be pregnant; two, they could possibly be in a state 
in which bearing and raising a child would be exorbitantly tax-
ing; and three, they might consider abortion to be immoral, but 
they might not.  The decision they make must be one they could 
abide by in self-respect, which as Rawls states, “implies a confi-
dence in one’s ability … to fulfill one’s intentions.”26  If Person A 
would choose to illegalize abortion, then were the veil lifted and 
were she to find herself pregnant, pro-choice, and desiring an 
abortion, would she be able to live a self-respectful and law-
abiding life in such a society?  The answer is clearly no.  On the 
other hand, if Person B would choose to mandate—not just legal-
ize—abortion, then were the veil lifted and she to find herself 
pregnant, pro-life, and desiring to bear the fetus, would she be 
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able to live a self-respectful and law-abiding life in such a soci-
ety?  The answer here is also no.  If, however, the society simply 
were to allow a person the choice to obtain an abortion, then Per-
son A could obtain an abortion, while Person B could bear her 
child.  Both could live in self-respect: both could follow their con-
sciences.  This same reasoning must apply to the doctors who 
deal most with the issue of abortion.  Were Person C to decide, 
behind the veil, that abortion ought to be legal and that doctors 
in the pertinent field ought to be required to handle the proce-
dure, only to discover that she in fact was a pro-life doctor, she 
could not live self-respectfully.  She could not follow her con-
science. 
Had Justice Blackmun utilized these concepts in issuing 
his opinion, the argument would have been much more philoso-
phically sound.  Such an argument would have been as follows: 
1) honest, goodhearted people can sincerely disagree on the mo-
rality of abortion; 2) these people disagree on whether or not fe-
tuses have achieved personhood; 3) the Constitution only secures 
the right to life for persons; 4) when there exists a legitimate dis-
agreement on the morality of an issue, the Court should err on 
the side of liberty (citing the Fourteenth Amendment) in order to 
avoid imposing a particular conception of the good upon people 
of other convictions; 5) in an effort to err on the side of liberty, 
the Court would grant the impregnated the right to choose 
whether or not to undertake an abortion at any stage of the preg-
nancy; 6) moreover, for liberty’s sake, the Court would also grant 
doctors the right to refuse to partake in the abortion procedure. 
Of Justice Rehnquist’s three points of dissent, this Rawl-
sian defense of abortion successfully bypasses two—the histori-
cal treatment of abortion and the arbitrary trimester scheme—
and offers a fuller and better explanation of the third—the as-
sumption that the right to privacy applies to abortions.  This de-
fense also bypasses the potential argument from the amount of 
suffering a pregnancy causes.  By not relying on an account of 
the history of abortion laws or on how much suffering pregnancy 
entails, this defense is sounder than that offered in Justice Black-
mun’s ruling.  While some might recoil at the idea of third-
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trimester abortions, the arbitrariness of the trimester scheme is 
too great to use it in formulating laws.  People behind the veil of 
ignorance must put aside their personal conceptions of the 
good—in this case, whether or not they consider abortions in the 
third trimester to be immoral—when they are deciding on the 
laws of their society.  The argument for third trimester abortions 
runs in parallel to that described earlier for abortions more gen-
erally.  Here it is important to emphasize that the law would not 
mandate that pregnant women undergo abortions, nor that doc-
tors with moral convictions against such procedures perform 
them. 
The Rawlsian explanation detailed in the prior para-
graphs of why pregnant women ought to have the private choice 
to undergo an abortion is difficult to dismiss on philosophical 
grounds.  The only way to refute the argument is by refuting 
Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and that cannot be done without dis-
missing the notion of selfless pursuit of self-interests and the en-
tirety of Rawls’ theory of justice.  While many philosophers have 
done just that, their alternative theories consistently seem to be 
of a worse nature.  If Rawls’ theory is dismissed, a different the-
ory must be accepted in order for societies to function, and the 
two leading alternatives both allow for practices widely and ac-
curately considered unacceptable.  A utilitarian theory of justice, 
under which a society perpetually seeks to maximize the good, 
fails to treat people as individuals with rights and freedoms wor-
thy of respect.  A libertarian theory of justice, such as that offered 
by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, institutes a callous 
social Darwinism, which does nothing to alleviate the suffering 
of the impoverished.  Rawls’ theory of justice is certainly prefer-
able to either of these theories, and the notion of the selfless pur-
suit of self-interest is preferable in its own right. 
Despite the fact that Rawls’ theory of justice outwardly 
seems silent on the issue of abortion, the theory offers, upon ex-
tended analysis, a clear argument in favor of legalizing abortion.  
Since any belief regarding the morality or immorality of abortion 
is purely that—a belief—and since particular conceptions of the 
good are to be disregarded behind the veil of ignorance and in 
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light of the arguments put forth here, the only reasonable ruling 
would be to legalize abortion.  A Rawlsian defense of abortion 
avoids the problems found in Justice Blackmun’s dubious ruling 
in Roe v. Wade and is thus much more difficult to refute.  It is im-
portant to stress that this does not settle the question of abor-
tion’s morality; rather, it settles only the question of abortion’s 
legality.  A truly unselfish pursuit of one’s self-interests, as 
shown by Rawls’ veil of ignorance, would lead to a unanimous 
verdict proclaiming abortion to be legal; hence, the legality of 
abortion ought to be guaranteed. 
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1. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 89. 
2. Rawls, “Fairness to Goodness,” 537. 
3. Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, 11, italics mine. 
4. Blackmun, “Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas 
County,” 36. 
5. Ibid., 36: “The detriment that the State would impose … by 
denying this choice altogether is apparent.  Specific and direct 
harm medically diagnosable … may be involved.  Maternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life 
and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care.  There is also the dis-
tress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already un-
able, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.” 
6. Ibid., 38. 
7. Ibid., 40. 
8. Ibid., 31. 
9. Ibid., 39: Justice Blackmun mentioned three ways in particular: 
first, the Texas law gave an exemption to “abortion[s] procured 
or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life 
of the mother”; second, the law did not consider a woman who 
had undergone an abortion as either “a principal or an accom-
plice”; and third, the penalty the law demanded for aborting a 
fetus was “significantly less” than that for murdering a person. 
10. Rehnquist, “Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Dissenting,” 46: Justice 
Rehnquist argues that the laws historically enacted in the U.S. 
pertaining to abortions actually proved the reverse.  “The fact 
that a majority of the States … have had restrictions on abortions 
for at least a century is a strong indication, it seems to me, that 
the asserted right to an abortion is not ‘so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’… 
[T]he very existence of the debate is evidence that the ‘right’ to 
an abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would 
have us believe.” 
11. Ibid., 46: “The decision here to break pregnancy into three 
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distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the State 
may impose in each one … partakes more of judicial legislation 
than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” 
12. Ibid., 45: “I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, 
that the right of ‘privacy’ is involved in this case.… [Abortions 
are] not ‘private’ in the ordinary usage of that word.  Nor is the 
‘privacy’ that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the 
freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to 
as embodying a right to privacy.” 
13. Nathanson, Aborting America, 220.  This is not one of the argu-
ments present in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, perhaps because it 
appears to belittle the real toil many women undergo in the 
course of pregnancy; nevertheless, it is worth considering.  Na-
thanson presents a detailed argument for this point, claiming, 
“Pregnancy is not a sickness. Few pregnant women are bedrid-
den and many, emotionally and physically, have never felt bet-
ter.” 
14. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266. 
15. Ibid., 53-54. 
16. Ibid., 53. 
17. Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, 296. 
18. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11. 
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20. Dworkin, “The Original Position,” 50. 
21. Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 235-36. 
22. Ibid., 235: Nagel considers whether people can truly hold be-
liefs that they know might be false.  While his argument poses 
several interesting questions, it is not of concern here.  People 
could and do exist who are skeptical of everything that is not 
verifiable, and if the non-skeptics were unable to distinguish be-
tween belief and fact, it is to these people we could turn. 
23. Hui, “Personhood and Bioethics: A Chinese Perspective,” 29. 
24. Kluge, The Practice of Death, 17.  (Cf. Ibid., 91: “A person is an 
entity … that is either presently aware in a manner characteristic 
of rational beings, or can become thus aware without any change 
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